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Abstract 
Ransomware is increasingly posing a threat to the security of information resources. Millions of dollars of 
monetary loss have been afflicted on end-users and corporations alike through unlawful deployment of 
ransomware. Through malware injection into end-user devices and subsequent extortion of their system or data, 
ransomware has emerged as a threat requiring immediate attention and containment by the cyber-security 
community. We conduct a detailed analysis of the steps of execution involved in ransomware deployment to 
facilitate readiness of the cyber-security community in containing the rapid proliferation of ransomware. This 
paper examines the evolution of malware over a period of 26 years and the emergence of ransomware in the 
cyber-threat landscape. Key findings on the evolution of ransomware and its use of emerging technologies are 
presented.  
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A HISTORICAL INSIGHT  
Cyber-extorting malware has been evolving for almost three decades. Whilst malware developers adopt new 
techniques to improve proliferation and evasion, security professionals respond reactively by playing catch-up. 
Zero-day attacks are thus rampant; frequent variations in malware signatures encumber the detection process and 
increase the level of risk that organisational networks face. 
Cyber-extortion threats are not new, the widely reported PC CYBORG (AIDS) Trojan was the trendsetter in 
1989. The strategies used by PC CYBORG are not too dissimilar to many new ransomware threats that have 
emerged over the last decade. PC CYBORG was delivered electronically via an infected floppy-disk, the 
installation used a dormancy period to evade users and authorities alike, which gave time for the malware to 
spread. It locked access to user files by encrypting the content and finally used a socially engineered message to 
claim the user was in ‘breach of a licencing agreement’ requiring it to pay $189 (via cheque posted to Panama) 
in order for a licence renewal (and decryption) disk to be sent.  
Much of the malware activity in the 1990s was from hobbyist hackers determined to prove their technical 
prowess. It wasn’t until the early 2000’s that malware authors started to gain financial reaps directly and 
malware became a profiteering business. Most profits were generated from: direct information theft; creation of 
“botnets” for-hire; and advertising revenue (Bechtel, 2014). Malware authors also profited through theft of 
banking credentials or sensitive passwords (Condon, 2012); or they amassed networks of malware compromised 
machines constituting a network of bots and leased the network to the highest-bidders. Botnets had value 
because cyber criminals could use them to launch large-scale cyber-attacks against corporate targets, run 
phishing campaigns to steal credentials, or drop further malware that could scour users’ hard drives for personal 
data and to assist in identity theft. Malware profits were dependent upon longevity i.e., persistence; by laying 
low and doing no obvious harm, malware could persist for long enough to steal information, spamming or 
powering botnets. The concept of extortion based malware – although present for over a decade – didn’t take off 
as a financial model until around 2012.  
Direct end-user extortion remained relatively unsophisticated until 2011; an era of “Fake AntiVirus” scams 
relied on social engineering techniques to trick naive users in to paying for non-existent virus removal tools. 
Many of these scams were eliminated by a crackdown on credit card payment facilities, the FakeAV threat dried 
up almost overnight (Krebs, 2011). Somewhat more complex malware used denial-of-service tactics to “lock” 
out a user from its system. These early “lockers” attacked the boot operations of a machine until a ransom was 
paid (Pantanilla, 2012). Because the file system content remained un-touched, security professionals rapidly 
adopted anti-virus recovery software to compensate. Although proposed by Young and Yung, 1996, the use of 
strong encryption to create “reversible denial of service attack[s]” didn’t gain popularity until the first encrypting 
locker PGPCoder/GPCode was released in 2005 (Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006a). GPCode represented the first 
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real world implementation of the schemes proposed by Young and Yung; encrypting disk content and 
demanding ransom payment. Many variants of GPCode contained flaws including poorly implemented 
encryption routines, insecure encryption keys, or poor file deletion strategies, which allowed recovery of deleted 
content; significantly however, GPCode continued to evolve, its deletion strategies became stronger and the 
encryption schemes and key lengths improved over time.  
Even with the advent of encrypting lockers, malware authors did not immediately adopt the direct end-user 
ransom approach. Such type of extortion required many points of contact between the affected end-user, 
payment gateways and the malware profiteer, encumbering the success in extortion. Ransomware needed a 3rd 
party payment gateway provider to process payments; and it required direct communication with the attacker to 
prove ransom payment and “reverse” the attack. Malware remained profitable primarily through information and 
resource theft; direct end-user extortion still remaining too complicated and risky.  
The perfect storm of ransomware needed three core technologies to align before it could become successful:  
 Requirement for strong, reversible encryption to lock up a user’s files, 
 Dependence on a system for anonymously communicate keys and decryption tools, and 
 Concealment i.e., setup of an untraceable way to pay the ransom. 
The first ransomware to successfully combine these attributes was CTB-Locker; CTB standing for “Curve, TOR, 
and Bitcoin”: elliptic curve cryptography provided fast secure encryption of file content. The Onion Routing 
(TOR) protocol allowed anonymous communication; and Bitcoin enabled secure, untraceable crypto-cash 
transactions. CTB-Locker was not without implementation flaws, however the business model made sense and 
within a very short period ransomware began to take off growing by 500% as reported in 2013 (Wood, 2014).  
Newer generations have started to spread to multiple platforms (BitDefender Labs, 2015; Kirk, 2015), seek out 
network shares and removable media; strategies that increase the reach of the technology, as well as reduce the 
effectiveness of network and external hard disk backups. If these traits prove to be effective, it is likely that new 
ransomware variants will improve upon them. While large corporate backup solutions currently offer protection 
against a wide range of threats, smaller organisations may not have sufficient financial or technical resources to 
institute strong backup procedures. 
While the concept of direct end-user extortion is terrifying and hones great media coverage; Kharraz et al. (2015) 
suggest that ransomware may be relatively easily defeated. The authors noted that many ransomware samples 
contained flaws or performed actions, which could be detected. They suggested that stopping ransomware 
attacks might not be as difficult as it appears; however if history is to provide guidance, ransomware should not 
be dismissed as a passing fad.  
This research shows ransomware’s history of adapting to defensive strategies; it is only a matter of time until all 
current protections are inadequate. It is essential that security professionals actively analyse and predict the 
direction of ransomware development in order to pre-emptively develop secure technologies that protect end-
users. Furthermore, the research shows the tenacity of ransomware developers; if the financial model evolves to 
a point where large corporate networks become viable targets, then they too will need to deal with ransomware 
threats. 
Research design and method  
The research sought to determine what features or ransomware have persisted over time. We addressed this 
question by identifying these so as to facilitate prediction of the direction to be taken by future generations of 
ransomware. 
A survey was conducted on several major ransomware families. The goal was to formalise a nomenclature for 
ransomware traits and identify what new traits were emerging over time. Twenty-nine variants in nine families 
of frequently cited ransomware were identified from popular security and virus research blogs. Each ransomware 
was individually researched to determine a release date and what features or traits it exhibited.  
Twenty-two “traits” (features) were selected for analysis (Table 1). These traits described the technical design of 
the ransomware from encryption technology through to payment options. The traits were selected based on 
features frequently described by the security research blogs in which they were identified.  
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Table 1 Ransomware selected for trait analysis 
Name  Date  Sources  
PC CYBORG  1989-12-19  (Smith, 2002)  
One Half Virus  1994-10-31  (Trend Micro, 2000) 
(Hoffman, n.d.)  
GPcode  2004-12-01  (Emm, 2008) 
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)  
GPCode.ac  2005-06-27  (F-Secure, 2005) 
(Nazarov, Gostev & Shevchenko, 2006) 
(Emm, 2008) 
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)  
GPCode.ad  2006-04-14  (Alan, 2006)  
GPCode.ae  2006-06-02  (Alan, 2006) 
(Emm, 2008) 
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)  
GPCode.af  2006-06-06  (Alan, 2006) 
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)  
GPCode.af2  2006-06-06  (Waldron, 2006) 
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)  
GPCode.ag  2006-06-07  (Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)  
GPCode.ak  2008-06-05  (Keizer, 2008) 
(AO Kaspersky Lab, 2005) 
(Dunn, 2008) 
(Tromer, 2008)  
GPCode.ax  2010-11-20  (Kamluk, 2010) 
(Lemos, 2010) 
(K, 2011)  
GPCode.bn  2011-03-26  (Brulez, 2011)  
Reveton.2012  2012-04-04  (Tikkanen & Karmina, 2012)  
Cryptolocker  2013-05-09  (Emsisoft Labs, 2013) 
(Jarvis, 2013) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
Reveton.2013  2013-09-10  (Kujawa, 2013)  
Reveton.XY  2013-10-22  (Horejsi, 2013)  
CryptoLocker 2.0  2013-12-19  (Lipovsky, 2013) 
(Pichel, 2013) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
CryptoDefense  2014-03-26  (Symantec Security Response, 2014) 
(Abrams, 2014a)  
CryptoDefense  2014-04-01  (Abrams, 2014a)  
CryptoWall  2014-06-26  (Subramaniam, 2014) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
CTB-Locker  2014-07-15  (Kafeine, 2014) 
(Abrams, 2014b)  
Reveton.2014  2014-08-19  (AVAST Software, 2014)  
CryptoWall 2.0  2014-10-01  (Allievi & Carter, 2015b) 
(Olson, 2014) 
(Code 42 Software, 2015) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
CryptoWall 3.0  2015-01-14  (Allievi & Carter, 2015a) 
(Code 42 Software, 2015) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
Reveton.2015  2015-02-05  (Saarinen, 2015)  
TeslaCrypt 0.2.5  2015-02-14  (Sinitsyn, 2015) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
TeslaCrypt 0.4.0  2015-02-14  (Sinitsyn, 2015) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
TeslaCrypt 2.0.0  2015-07-13  (Duncan, 2015) 
(Sinitsyn, 2015) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
TeslaCrypt 2.1  2015-09-07  (Abrams, 2015) 
(syntx, 2015) 
(BloodDolly, 2015) 
(Bottomley, 2015)  
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The list of traits identified for analysis is defined as follows in Table 2:  
Table 2 Ransomware traits and benefits conferred 
Abbreviation Trait Description 
Encrypts  Encrypting  The ransomware encrypts user file content as opposed to simply “locking” access 
to the PC  
Strng Cphr  Strong Cypher  The ransomware includes a strong and well implemented encryption cipher.  
PKI  PKI  The use of PKI allows ransomware to encrypt content using a public key. The 
attacker controls the secret part of the key and is the only actor capable of 
decrypting the messages.  
Autonomy  Autonomous  Autonomous destructive execution starts execution without the need to contact a 
C2 server. Variants that require C2 communications before their destructive 
routines start may be blocked by detecting network signatures.  
DGA  DGA  Domain Generation Algorithms [DGA]s make take-downs of the C2 server more 
difficult. With static IP and domains, authorities can work with ISPs and domain 
registrars to block access to the offending servers. With a DGA, the server’s host 
name is unpredictable, known only to the attacker.  
HiddenTOR  TOR  Use of The Onion Routing [TOR] protocol provides a high degree of security and 
anonymity to the attackers and their servers.  
HiddenI2P  I2P  Uses the Invisible Internet Project [12P] network for communication. Similar to 
the TOR network.  
HideClient  Built in 
TOR/I2P Client  
Anonymous network client built-in to the ransomware code. With a built in TOR 
or I2P clients, the encrypted “circuits” are created internally, the data leaving the 
infected machine is encrypted and the endpoints are concealed. This makes 
detection and mitigation significantly harder.  
SecureEnc  Cryptographical
ly Secure Data 
Encryption  
The malware is theoretically secure i.e., the concepts employed are based on well 
known and studied cryptographic principles. Tried and tested cryptography is 
strong by design, the wider the distribution of the algorithms the more peer 
review and the stronger the cryptographic design.  
SecureKeys  Cryptographical
ly Secure Keys  
The keys used for encryption are of sufficient length and type to make cracking 
the encrypted content impossible without the correct key.  
SecKeyMgmt  Secure Key 
Management  
Key management is core to cryptographic security, for symmetric cryptography 
the keys cannot be permitted to persist on the hard disk or in memory. When 
using PKI, the secrecy of the private-key is paramount to the security of the 
whole cryptosystem.  
ScanNetDrv  Scans Network 
Drives  
The destructive code scans for files on external and network drives. This can be 
especially destructive for business and corporate offices, it can also find and 
encrypt network backups  
SecErase  Securely Erases 
Originals  
Securely deletes the original “encrypted” version of the user’s files. Without 
secure deletion and overwrite, it may be possible to recover file content from 
internal operating system “shadow copies” or using file recovery software.  
PK DL  Public Key 
Download  
By creating server-side secret keys and releasing only public keys for infected 
computers the encrypted data is protected. Infected users have no access to the 
secret key which makes decryption impossible.  
DH-ECC  DH-ECC PKI  Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve Cryptography [DH-ECC] is used to generate 
public keys. DH-ECC is a new generation of fast and very secure public key 
algorithms.  
C2 Server  Uses C2 Server  Communicates with a command and control [C2] server to provide information 
or receive processing data or instructions. 
C2 Hidden  C2 on Hidden 
Network  
Command and control takes place over anonymous networks. This makes 
takedowns of control servers more difficult as law enforcement and ISPs cannot 
identify traffic content, specific Internet hosts, or domains in use.  
PayProcOK  Good Payment 
Protocols  
The payment and verification protocol is secure; the ransomware has a reliable 
way of verifying payments. This also means that the payment verification cannot 
be faked or circumvented.  
PayPrvider  Uses Semi-
Anonymous 
Payment 
Authority  
The malware uses an anonymous payment method. By using secure anonymous 
payments the attackers can receive their cash without leaving a “paper trail”. All 
centralised payment processors leave some type of paper trail; however, different 
processors have different identity requirements for their clients.  
CryptCash  Uses Crypto 
Currency  
Crypto currencies like Bitcoin offer secure, irreversible transactions. These types 
of payments are equivalent to cash passed from one person to another. Some 
ransomware also steal Bitcoins directly from electronic wallets.  
StealCred  Steals 
Credentials  
Steals user login, banking or identity credentials in addition to ransom demand.  
StealProc  Steals 
Processing 
Uses the infected machine to perform computing or network operations in 
addition to ransom demand. This could include password cracking, Bitcoin 
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Abbreviation Trait Description 
Power  mining, operating as part of a bot-net, or sending spam.  
A ransomware traits matrix (Table 3) was produced to show the inclusion of “secure” traits and how they 
evolved over time. The table includes the ransomware variant name, the approximate date it was first identified 
and an assessment to identify whether specific traits were present and how well they were implemented. 
RESULTS  
Ransomware samples with first-observed dates ranging from December 1989 to July 2015 were identified. Of 
the twenty-nine strains identified, over half (15) were released in the last two years. A clear increase in the rate 
of new ransomware variants can be observed from Figure 1.  
Examining the traits of the ransomware shows that while the first encrypting ransomware was uncovered in 
1989, the first use of strong cryptographic principles was not until 2013, at which time ransomware began using 
cryptographically secure encryption algorithms. Other significant improvements can be seen in the use of 
anonymous networks like TOR and I2P and the introduction of crypto currencies. The use of anonymous hidden 
networks first appeared in mid-2014 for payment verification; since then, three-quarters of the ransomware 
variants observed used some type of anonymising service to enable secure communication. Crypto currencies 
have also significantly impacted the ransomware threat landscape. Bitcoin was first used in 2013 by 
Cryptolocker and again, approximately three-quarters of ransomware variants have included support for crypto 
currencies.  
The data shows the enhancements to ransomware as a malware tactic. A brief increase in the numbers of 
ransomware variants during 2006-2007 was due to the introduction of the first variants of GPCode. Since 2010, 
ransomware variants became even more prominent. Figure 1 shows that technologies including crypto currencies 
and anonymous hidden networks are relatively new on the scene. The uptake of cryptocurrencies has been 
significant between 2013 and 2015 and data regarding the use anonymous networks has just begun to emerge. 
Moreover, the use of the TOR anonymization protocol saw a significant increase 2014 onwards. 
Table 3 Matrix of ransomware security traits for selected strains 
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PC CYBORG  1989-12-19  √   √                   
One Half Virus  1994-10-31  √   √                   
GPcode  2004-12-01  √   √               √    
GPCode.ac  2005-06-27  √  o √     x x x        √    
GPCode.ad  2006-04-14  √  o √     x x x        √    
GPCode.ae  2006-06-02  √  o √     x x x        √    
GPCode.af  2006-06-06  √  o √     x x x        √    
GPCode.af2  2006-06-06  √ x o √     x x x        √    
GPCode.ag  2006-06-07  √ x √ √     x √ x        √    
GPCode.ak  2008-06-05  √ x √ √     o o o        √    
GPCode.ax  2010-11-20  √ √ √ √     √ √ √       o √    
GPCode.bn  2011-03-26  √ √ √ √     √ √ x       o √    
Reveton.2012  2012-04-04     √            o  o √    
Cryptolocker  2013-05-09  √ √ √  o    √ √ √ √  √  √  o √ √   
Reveton.2013  2013-09-10     √            o  o √   √ 
Reveton.XY  2013-10-22     √            o  o √    
CryptoLocker 2.0  2013-12-19  √ √ √      √ √ √ √  √  √  o  √   
CryptoDefense  2014-03-26  √ √ √   o   √ √ x     √ o      
CryptoDefense  2014-04-01  √ √ √   o   √ √ √  o   √ o      
CryptoWall  2014-06-26  √ √ √      √ √ √ o  √  o  o  √   
CTB-Locker  2014-07-15  √ √ √ o  o   √ √ √ o  √ √ √  o  √   
Reveton.2014  2014-08-19     √            √  o √ o √ √ 
CryptoWall 2.0  2014-10-01  √ √ √   o   √ √ √ o  √  √ √ √  √   
CryptoWall 3.0  2015-01-14  √ √ √    √  √ √ √ o  √  √ √ √  √   
Reveton.2015  2015-02-05     √            √  o √ o √ √ 
TeslaCrypt 0.2.5  2015-02-14  √ √    √   √ √ x     √ √ x  √   
TeslaCrypt 0.4.0  2015-02-14  √ √  o  √   √ √ o √ √   √ o √  √   
TeslaCrypt 2.0.0  2015-07-13  √ √ √ o  √   √ √ o √ √  √ √ √ √  √   
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TeslaCrypt 2.1  2015-09-07  √ √ √ o  √   √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √  √   
√ = well implemented; o = not fully implemented; x = implementation broken 
A brief increase was noticed during 2006-2007 through introduction of first variants of GPCode, since 2010 
ransomware variants become more prominent. Figure 1 shows that technologies including crypto currencies and 
anonymous hidden networks are relatively new on the scene. The uptake of crypto currencies has been 
significant between 2013 and 2015 and data regarding the use anonymous networks has just begun to emerge.  
 
Figure 1 Increase in ransomware strains and security features identified over time 
Another trend shows the increasing use of multiple security features and technologies; original ransomware 
variants were very simple by comparison. The data indicate that many current variants of ransomware have 
copied code and features from predecessors. An exception is a ransomware suite called Reveton, which has been 
through many revisions since 2012 and is still in circulation today, even with minor variations from one version 
to another. A closer examination of Reveton features indicate that it’s “locking” performs no encryption it 
simply locks the "boot process" to interrupt standard PC operation.  
DISCUSSION  
The data show the general trend of ransomware to build on the technologies of previous generations. They also 
show that the encrypting ransomware is on the increase, each generation is building on the successes (and fixing 
the errors) of previous generations. In some cases as with early versions of GPCode, rapid iterations can be seen. 
Each new version of GPCode quickly plugged the holes and errors of the previous version. The result of these 
rapid updates was that GPCode became “unbreakable” in less than five years. The lessons learned and published 
vulnerability analysis has also taught other developers what GPCode did wrong; since GPCode.ax, no significant 
encrypting ransomware has utilised poor RSA key lengths or constructs.  
The significant developments over time have been the addition of increasingly secure algorithms and key 
management methodologies. The evolutions have also shown a migration away from “home-brew” encryption 
routines to well established and proven cryptographic constructions. Most new secure variants of encrypting 
ransomware use a combination of: public key cryptography; >AES-256 block ciphers; remote public key 
generation; and C2 server communication.  
One interesting variant that persists despite lacking any encryption features is Reveton. All variants perform 
locking operations based on interrupting the normal boot sequence. This attack is relatively easily circumvented 
and clean from an infected PC. A brief search through the literature on Reveton indicates that the locking 
component of the malware may be incidental to its other operations which include: password and credential 
stealing; Bitcoin mining (a legitimate process); and stealing of Bitcoin wallets (Kujawa, 2013) (Saarinen, 2015). 
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The ransom component apparently offers little benefit other than to frustrate user access to an infected PC while 
other malicious activities are taking place.  
The recent emergence of TOR and I2P anonymous networks as a communication channel shows promise; 
logically, these encrypted and hidden networks provide malicious attackers another level of anonymity. There 
appears to be a general uptake of the technology, however the limited data makes it difficult to forecast future 
trends. It may be that TOR and I2P are too complicated for easy implementation; however, if other technologies 
are to provide any guidance, the learning experiences from each generation provide improved models for future 
developments.  
One example of the rapid absorption of new technologies can be seen in the increasing use of the Bitcoin crypto 
currency as a payment method. This may be due to well-documented Bitcoin protocols and the widely publicised 
Bitcoin brand (Bitcoin Project, 2015). Implementation of Bitcoin payments requires very little overhead and may 
even be easier than clearing payments through conventional payment gateways and prepaid “debit” cards. The 
laundering and liquidation of Bitcoin assets is also a relatively straightforward process, with the protocol 
allowing “coins” to be combined and spilt arbitrarily. Traceability of Bitcoins is a field of active research (Reid 
& Harrigan, 2011), however the general user perception is that Bitcoin transactions are completely un-traceable; 
certainly they offer far greater anonymity than other online payment methods. 
CONCLUSION  
Through this paper we have presented a categorisation and an analysis of several key features of ransomware. In 
addition, we presented the evolution of ransomware over a period of twenty-six years. The environment of 
ransomware proliferation and its widespread and menacing threat landscape was also analysed.  
Risks to corporate data are often mitigated through active security management, documented security policies, 
controlled access environments, skilled security personnel and enterprise firewalls and backup solutions. 
However, it is difficult to believe the technical or financial resources available to smaller organisations and 
individuals will be sufficient to protect against this rapidly evolving threat. The current state of malware research 
is very limited in contribution. Unlike vulnerability analysis – which is well documented in exploit databases – 
malware research and analysis is lacking peer-reviewed data resources and standardised analysis of malware 
development. Whilst malware analysis is conducted on an individual or a software manufacturer level, the 
opportunity exists to create a formal approach and vocabulary for convenient analysis of malware, variants and 
evolution. 
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